

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2725

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USMISSION NATO

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DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENTS OF AUGUST 22, 1975

(SALT TWO - 740)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 22, 1975, INCLUDING LANGUAGE
FOR ARTICLE VII.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

AUGUST 22, 1975

MR. MINISTER:

I

AT OUR LAST MEETING, THE SOVIET DELEGATION TABLED REVISED
LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE XII OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THIS REVISED
PROPOSAL PROVIDES, IN SUBSTANCE, THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE
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2,400 AGGREGATE LIMITATION OR IN EXCESS OF THE 1,320

LIMITATION ON MIRVED MISSILES, SUCH ARMS SHALL BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED, NOT BY THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT-- THAT IS, OCTOBER 3, 1977--BUT, WITHIN A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR AFTER THAT DATE. THUS, THE SOVIET SIDE IS IN EFFECT PROPOSING THAT KEY ELEMENTS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING NOT COME INTO EFFECT UNTIL OCTOBER 3, 1978.

II

AS I HAVE STATED ON EARLIER OCCASIONS, IT IS THE US VIEW THAT BOTH SIDES ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS AGREED AT VLADIVOSTOK BY OCTOBER 3, 1977. IN FACT, THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, PERMITS OF NO OTHER INTERPRETATION. PARAGRAPH 1 OF THAT DOCUMENT STATES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT "WILL COVER THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1985...", AND PARAGRAPH 2.A SAYS, "DURING THE TIME OF A NEW AGREEMENT EACH OF THE SIDES WILL BE ENTITLED TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER OF DELIVERY VEHICLES OF STRATEGIC ARMS NOT EXCEEDING 2,400."

III

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE AIDE-MEMOIRE ALSO PROVIDES THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL OCTOBER 1977, AND THAT IS INDEED THE CASE. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT FORCES PERMITTED, EXPRESSLY OR IMPLICITLY, UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE 2,400 OR 1,320 LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT MAY BE RETAINED AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THIS SUBJECT, ONE CAN ONLY COME TO THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSION. FURTHERMORE, SUCH RETENTION OF FORCES WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE 1973 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH CALLS FOR "THE EARLIEST ADOPTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS." TO CARRY OVER INTO THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE, IN OUR VIEW, ENTIRELY WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION. BY ITS OWN TERMS, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT EXPIRES ON OCTOBER 3, 1977.

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NOR, AS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ASSERTED IN THE PAST, IS OUR PRESENT SITUATION ANALOGOUS TO THAT WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE ABM TREATY IN 1972. AT THAT TIME THE SCC DID NOT EXIST AND, THEREFORE, PROCEDURES FOR THE DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING OF EXCESS COMPONENTS HAD NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED. MORE IMPORTANT, THERE WAS NO TIME PERIOD BETWEEN THE SIGNATURE OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE COMING INTO EFFECT OF ITS OBLIGATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SCC HAS NOW BEEN FUNCTIONING FOR ALMOST

TWO YEARS AND HAS GAINED VALUABLE EXPERIENCE AND ESTABLISHED HELPFUL PRECEDENTS FOR THE TASK OF MONITORING THE DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING OF EXCESS SYSTEMS. MOREOVER, AND MOST IMPORTANT, ASSUMING THAT WE ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE SET AT VLADIVOSTOK OF COMPLETING THE NEW AGREEMENT IN 1975, THERE WILL BE AMPLE TIME FOR THE SIDES TO COMPLY WITH THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS BEFORE OCTOBER 1977.

IV

THEREFORE, MR. MINISTER, THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY PRECEDENT, LEGAL BASIS, PRACTICAL REASON, OR OTHER RATIONALE FOR THE REVISED PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XII, WHICH PROPOSAL RUNS COUNTER TO THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. THUS, WE MUST LOOK TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO EXPLAIN THE REASON BEHIND THIS PROPOSAL AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE REASONS WHY THE SOVIET DELEGATION BELIEVES IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE PARTIES TO RETAIN EXCESS SYSTEMS BEYOND OCTOBER 1977.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 299

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

AUGUST 22, 1975

MR. MINISTER,

I

WITH REFERENCE TO OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF TITLE VII OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT, I AM TODAY TABLING A REVISED US PROPOSAL FOR THAT ARTICLE. THE TEXT OF THE US PROPOSAL IS:

1. THE LIMITATION PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE III OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL NOT APPLY TO ICBM AND SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS.

2. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT:

(A) THERE SHALL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM OR SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS OR IN THE NUMBER OF SUCH LAUNCHERS
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FOR HEAVY ICBMS,

(B) CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AT TEST RANGES SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF TESTING AND TRAINING,

(C) OPERATIONAL ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS USED FOR TESTING OR TRAINING SHALL BE CONSIDERED OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS.

II

PARAGRAPH 1 REFLECTS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT THE LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE III SHALL NOT APPLY TO ICBM AND SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE US PROPOSES THAT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD REFLECT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES THAT THE TERM "TEST" INCLUDES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE PROPOSAL I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY OMITS ANY REFERENCE TO LAUNCHERS FOR SPACE VEHICLES, OR, AS DESCRIBED IN THE PROPOSED SOVIET DRAFT, "LAUNCHERS OF BOOSTERS OF SPACE VEHICLES FOR EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE . . .". IT IS THE US VIEW THAT SUCH LAUNCHERS WHEN EMPLOYED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SPACE EXPLORATION AND THE USE OF OUTER SPACE ARE NOT PROPERLY THE SUBJECT OF AN AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED. IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT NEITHER SIDE PROPOSES ANY LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF SPACE LAUNCHERS. IT IS NOT NECESSARY, THEREFORE, TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC EXEMPTION OF SPACE LAUNCHERS FROM THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE III.

THE QUESTION MAY ARISE CONCERNING A LAUNCHER USED FOR BOTH SPACE PURPOSES AND FOR ICBM OR SLBM TESTING PURPOSES. IT IS THE US VIEW THAT ANY SUCH LAUNCHER NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR SPACE PURPOSES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A TEST LAUNCHER, SUBJECT TO THE EXEMPTION AND TO THE LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS THAT PERTAIN TO TEST LAUNCHERS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE US FORMULATION SPECIFIES THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM OR SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS OR IN THE NUMBER OF SSCH LAUNCHERS
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FOR HEAVY ICBMS. THE US PROPOSES THAT IT BE AGREED BY THE PARTIES THAT THE TERM "SIGNIFICANT INCREASE" AS USED IN THIS SUBPARAGRAPH MEANS AN INCREASE OF 15 PERCENT OR MORE.

SUBPARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE US FORMULATION REFLECTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED LANGUAGE IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

WITH RESPECT TO SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) IT IS THE US VIEW THAT ALL OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS, WHEREVER LOCATED, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS ALSO USED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING SHOULD NOT BE EXEMPT FROM THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

III

MR. MINISTER, THE NEW US FORMULATION WHICH I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY WILL, I TRUST, PERMIT US TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE HAD ON ARTICLE VII AND THIS MOVE OUR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.
JOHNSON

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